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The current research focuses on how children’s inquiry may be affected by how they
learn about which sources are likely to provide accurate, helpful information. Four- and
5-year-olds (N = 188) were tasked with asking two different puppet informants – one
knowledgeable and one not knowledgeable – questions to determine which of four
pictures was inside of a set of boxes. Before beginning the task, children learned about
the knowledge status of the two informants in one of three learning conditions: (a)
by witnessing how the informants answered sample questions (i.e., show condition),
(b) by being told what informants knew (i.e., tell condition), or (c) by both (i.e., show
& tell condition). Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds on most parts of the inquiry
process. Overall, children were less certain about which informant had been most helpful
when they found out that information solely via observation as compared to when they
had some third-party information about the informant knowledge. However, children
adjusted their questioning strategies appropriately, more frequently asking questions
that served to double check the answers they were receiving in the observation only
condition. In sum, children were highly resilient, adjusting their questioning strategies
based on the information provided, leading to no overall differences in their accuracy
of determining the contents of the boxes between the three learning conditions.
Implications for learning from others are discussed.
Keywords: social cognition, selective trust, questions, information seeking, childhood, inquiry, cognitive
development
INTRODUCTION
Children are often confronted with problems that they cannot immediately solve on their own. At
times, they may discover the right answers through exploration (e.g., Legare and Lombrozo, 2014)
or simply eavesdropping on others (e.g., Mills et al., 2012). Other times, though, children must
actively seek information from others by asking questions.
Past research has identified that the process of gathering information by asking questions
involves at least four steps: (1) recognizing when solving a problem may require assistance
from others, (2) deciding whom to question, (3) determining what to ask, and (4) deciding
how much information to ask for in order to solve a given problem (see Mills and Landrum,
2014, for a review). Not surprisingly, there are developmental improvements in children’s ability
to successfully use this process of inquiry to gather information: 5-year-olds tend to be more
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successful than 3- and 4-year-olds at identifying whom to
question and at asking enough questions to narrow down the
solution set to one possible correct answer (Mills et al., 2010,
2011).
The current research focuses on how inquiry is affected by
the way children learn about which sources are most likely to
provide accurate, helpful information. When faced with multiple
potential sources of information, young children have to override
the assumption that all sources should be accurate (Harris and
Koenig, 2006; Jaswal et al., 2010; Mills, 2013), which takes
considerable cognitive resources. Thus, it is often challenging for
children to determine which informant is most likely to provide
accurate, helpful responses to questions. Presumably, the more
challenging it is to determine which informant to question, the
more difficult it is to engage in successful inquiry.
Evidence to date supports this claim. For example, Mills
et al. (2011) created a task during which 3- to 5-year-olds were
able to direct questions to puppets (i.e., informants) in order
to determine which of two or four cards was hidden inside of
a box (see also Mosher and Hornsby, 1966; Chouinard, 2007;
Legare et al., 2013). Before the task, children were given the
opportunity to learn through experience how the informants
respond to questions (with the design based on selective trust
research; see Mills, 2013 for a review). In the within-subjects
ignorant informant condition, children were introduced to one
informant who answered sample questions correctly and would
presumably answer questions correctly during the task (i.e.,
the knowledgeable informant) and one informant who verbally
indicated his ignorance on sample questions (i.e., the ignorant
informant) and did not provide answers to the questions. In the
within-subjects inaccurate informant condition, a knowledgeable
informant was contrasted with an informant who consistently
provided inaccurate responses to sample questions but did
not verbally indicate ignorance (i.e., the inaccurate informant).
After the introduction, children were encouraged to ask the
informants questions to determine what was inside a set of
boxes. It was expected that children would have an easier time
distinguishing between the helpful and unhelpful informants
in the ignorant informant condition than in the inaccurate
informant condition, given that discounting a source who clearly
marks ignorance with paralinguistic cues and provides no answer
is easier than discounting a source who does not indicate
ignorance and provides an answer (e.g., Koenig and Harris,
2005). Children performed as expected, directing more questions
to the knowledgeable informant and obtaining more correct
answers when the knowledgeable puppet was contrasted with
an ignorant puppet (i.e., the ignorant condition) as opposed to
an inaccurate one (i.e., the inaccurate condition; Mills et al.,
2011).
This evidence suggests that children’s success at using inquiry
to gather information is influenced by how easy it is for
children to determine which informant will be most helpful.
Building on this finding, we ask the following question in
this study: how do ways of learning about each source’s
knowledge status influence the success of children’s inquiry?
Indeed, there are a number of different cues that can provide
information about how someone might respond to questions.
For instance, a child may learn that someone is good at
math from observing that person’s behavior (e.g., witnessing
Courtney repeatedly solving math problems correctly) or from
third-party report (e.g., hearing “Courtney is good at math”).
Certainly, observing someone’s behavior on a task can help
children make some inferences regarding that person’s likely
future behavior on a similar task (e.g., likelihood of providing
helpful answers to questions; see Landrum et al., 2015 for a
theoretical framework; see Mills, 2013 for a review). Indeed, at
times, first-hand observation may not lead to clear intuitions
regarding future behavior. For example, preschool-aged children
who witnessed short demonstrations of informants’ knowledge in
training performed nowhere near ceiling when making decisions
regarding which informant to trust for new information (e.g.,
Birch et al., 2008). Their performance suggests a level of
uncertainty in whom to trust that might not be present if
children are explicitly told which informant is likely to be most
helpful.
Supporting this, recent research has suggested that preschool-
aged children are more successful at predicting someone’s
behavior and explicitly labeling which informant is most accurate
when the information has been gained via third-party report
(e.g., “Johnny is very nice”) as opposed to via descriptions
of behavioral evidence (e.g., “Johnny helped carry a woman’s
box”; Liu et al., 2007; Johnston et al., 2015). There is also
evidence that being forewarned about a source’s knowledge
status or intentions improves performance on related cognitive
tasks. For example, adults who receive information about the
possible deceptive or inaccurate nature of a source prior to being
exposed to the source’s message tend to process the message
more cautiously (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), and preschoolers
are much better at rejecting deceptive claims when they have
been explicitly warned of a speaker’s potentially deceptive
intent (Lee and Cameron, 2000). The key thread in these
separate lines of research is that third-party reports regarding
an informant’s knowledge status may be beneficial for children
as they engage in the inquiry process. Crucially, explicitly
labeling one informant as being very helpful at answering
questions and another informant as not being very helpful at
answering questions may save children the cognitive resources
needed to decide to which source to direct their questions.
As long as children believe the person providing the labels
is knowledgeable and helpful (instead of deceptive; see Shafto
et al., 2012; Landrum et al., 2015), then children may feel
comfortable trusting that person’s labels. Moreover, it may be that
the combination of explicit labeling followed by the opportunity
to observe behaviors that match the descriptions provided in the
explicit labeling leads to the best understanding of who knows
what.
In order to examine how different aspects of the problem-
solving process are influenced by the way in which children learn
about how informants are likely to respond to questions, we
used a moderately constrained problem-solving task: children
were presented with four pictures that could be inside a box
and were given the opportunity to ask questions to either
or both of two informants in order to determine which
of the pictures was inside the box. Before beginning the
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task, children learned about the knowledge status of the two
informants in one of three learning conditions: a) behavioral
observation of a scripted question-and-answer training session—
henceforth labeled as the show condition, b) third-party
report through an explicit labeling training session – the
tell condition, and c) both third-party report and behavioral
observation – the show & tell condition. Mirroring past research
(Mills et al., 2011), each child solved problems with two
sets of informants that they were introduced to within their
learning condition: (1) a knowledgeable informant contrasted
with a guesser informant who clearly marked his ignorance
with paralinguistic cues before providing an inaccurate guess
(the guessing informant condition) and (2) a knowledgeable
informant contrasted with an inaccurate informant who provided
an inaccurate answer without further cues (the inaccurate
informant condition).
Consistent with past research, we hypothesized developmental
differences in performance overall: we expected that 5-year-
olds would outperform 4-year-olds in directing questions to
the appropriate sources, in asking effective questions, and in
obtaining correct answers to the problems. We also hypothesized
that explicitly labeling each source’s knowledge status before
children began the problem-solving task (the show & tell
condition as well as the tell condition) would make it easier
for children to determine which source to question than
when they had to learn each informant’s knowledge status
from observation alone (the show condition). Furthermore,
we hypothesized that the show & tell condition would lead
to the best performance, since children would have the
benefit of both explicit labels and evidence from observation
confirming those labels to guide their interactions during the
task.
Moreover, in our view, inquiry can be challenging, and thus
excessive cognitive load at one point in the process may tax
resources throughout the process (Mills and Landrum, 2014).
In other words, if a child is straining to figure out which
informant to question, the child may also struggle to figure
out what to ask: there may simply not be enough mental
resources available for the inquiry process. Based on that
perspective, we expected that learning condition would influence
the rest of their performance on the task: children would
ask more effectively worded questions and would accurately
solve more problems for the conditions in which each source’s
knowledge status is explicitly labeled, performing better for
the show & tell condition and the tell condition compared
to the show condition. Similarly, we also anticipated that
children would perform better on all aspects of the task when a
knowledgeable informant was paired with a guessing informant
than when paired with an inaccurate informant. Since the
guessing informant continues to express his ignorance before
providing an answer throughout the study, children’s cognitive
load should be markedly reduced. Finally, we expected that
how children learned about the sources might influence other
aspects of the problem-solving process, such as their explicit
understanding of which informant was most accurate and the
kinds of questioning strategies children employed to solve the
problems.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were 96 4-year-olds (Mage = 4.6, SD = 0.30 years;
46 female) and 92 5-year-olds (Mage = 5.4, SD = 0.23 years; 40
female) recruited from preschools in the greater North Dallas
area. Six additional children (5 4-year-olds, 1 5-year-olds) began
testing but were excluded for being unwilling to engage in the
tasks (e.g., disruptive, unwilling to respond to questions). The
sample was mostly white and middle class with 8% reporting that
they were of Latino descent. Each child was tested two separate
times in a quiet room in the preschool, each session taking about
20 to 25 min.
Overview
This data was part of a larger study examining how children
learn from others. This study was carried out in accordance
with the recommendations of the Institutional Review Board of
the University of Texas at Dallas. Participants and their parents
provided informed consent. On 1 day of testing, children engaged
in tasks designed to examine their abilities to solve problems by
directing effective questions to the most appropriate informants.
A second day of testing examined questions not relevant to the
current paper. Children received a small toy after each day of
testing along with a certificate after completing the second day
of testing.
Materials
Forty-seven different simple line drawings on small notecards
were used in the study. For the first warm-up task, 7 cards were
designed to prime the children to attend to the dimensions of
the drawings on the cards (i.e., shape and color). For the test
phase, 40 cards were used. Each trial (8 total, 4 for each of the two
within-subjects informant conditions – the inaccurate informant
condition and the guessing informant condition) consisted of five
cards that varied along the two dimensions. One card was the
target card (e.g., a green apple) that was hidden inside a box,
and four cards served as the possible options for the question-
asking task (e.g., a green apple, a green truck, a red apple, a red
truck). Eight 3.5′′ × 3.5′′ × 1′′ boxes were used, each containing
a different target card and corresponding set of options.
Two animal puppets were used in the second warm-up task
designed to encourage the children to become more comfortable
asking questions (a pig and a sheep) and two ecologically matched
pairs of animal puppets were used as informants for the study (a
lion and a bear, and a horse and a cow).
Design
Two experimenters conducted the study: an experimenter who
interacted with the child and an assistant who monitored the
stimuli, recorded the data, and served as a confederate. Each
experimental session consisted of a warm-up phase and a
test phase (see Figure 1). The test phase utilized a split plot
experimental design, S(A)xB, where learning condition (show,
tell, show & tell) was a between-subjects manipulation and
informant condition (inaccurate informant, ignorant informant)
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FIGURE 1 | Flowchart depicting the study design. Participants
maintained the same learning condition (puppet familiarization) throughout the
study (e.g., a participant was in the Show condition for both sets of test trials).
was a within-subjects manipulation. We describe this design in
more detail in Section “Test Phase”.
Warm-Up Phase
The children participated in two warm-up tasks designed to
prepare the participants for the test phase. The first task was
a game designed to help participants think about the different
dimensions of the line drawings on the cards (e.g., color, shape,
function). The purpose of the task was to prepare children to
attend to the characteristics of each line drawing so that they
would be armed with more potential questions to ask later in
the test trials. This task contained three parts. In the first part,
children were asked to describe one card (e.g., a line drawing of a
green frog). In the second, children were asked to describe a pair
of cards that varied along one dimension (e.g., an orange key,
an orange spoon). In the third, children were asked to describe
four cards that varied along two dimensions (e.g., a yellow hat,
a red hat, a yellow camera, and a red camera). Children were
first encouraged to respond with as much information about
the pictures on cards as they could think of. Then, children
were encouraged to think about the different dimensions of the
cards that they had not mentioned. For the two-card part and
the four-card part, children were encouraged to think about the
similarities and differences between the cards, if they did not
spontaneously provide this information.
For the second warm-up task, children were introduced to a
situation in which a sheep puppet wanted to ask a pig puppet
questions, but was too shy (i.e., the shy sheep task). This task
had been used in prior research to encourage children to elicit
different kinds of questions (see Crain and Thornton, 1998). Each
child was encouraged to put the sheep puppet on his or her
hand. Then, the child was told the following, “Sheep is very shy.
He wants to ask Pig some questions, but he’s so shy he can’t
think of what to say. Let’s help him! I’ll tell you what Sheep
would like to ask, and you make him ask Pig the question.” The
experimenters matched the puppet gender to the gender of the
child. The child was prompted to ask three questions, designed
so that one would elicit a yes response (Does Pig like ice cream?),
one would elicit a no response (is Pig’s favorite color pink?), and
one was open ended (What is Pig’s favorite toy?). For instance, the
experimenter said, “Sheep wants to know if Pig likes ice cream.
Can you make Sheep ask Pig if he likes ice cream?” If children
had difficulty formulating a question or were not sure what to say,
the confederate would provide a suggestion, such as “how about
saying, ‘hey Pig, do you like ice cream?”’ The goal of this task was
to help the child become more comfortable asking questions and
interacting with the puppets, and to hear both yes and no answers.
Test Phase
The test phase included two within-subjects informant
conditions: an inaccurate informant condition, in which a
knowledgeable puppet was contrasted with an inaccurate puppet
who always gave inaccurate, but plausible, answers, and a
guessing informant condition, in which a knowledgeable puppet
was contrasted with a guesser puppet who verbally indicated a
lack of certainty (e.g., “hmm, I’m not sure. I’ll guess. . .”) and
then provided an inaccurate, but plausible, response. For each
informant condition, children first learned about the puppets
(i.e., puppet familiarization) before continuing to the test trials.
Each informant condition included four test trials (i.e., four
boxes). The puppet pairs, the stimulus sets, and the order of
the within-subjects informant conditions were counterbalanced
between-subjects.
The test phase also included three between-subjects learning
conditions: a tell condition, in which children heard a label
of how each informant was likely to answer questions, a show
condition, in which children watched a demonstration for how
each informant was likely to answer questions, and a show &
tell condition, in which children experienced both. These are
described in more detail below.
Puppet Familiarization
For each of the two within-subjects informant conditions,
children experienced one puppet familiarization task and a set of
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test trials (see Figure 1). The familiarization task was designed so
that children could meet the puppets and get a sense for how the
puppets answer questions without biasing the children toward the
specific questions used for solving the problems in the test trials.
After the warm-up phase, children were introduced to the first
pair of puppets who would help them figure out which of four
pictures was inside the box. Children were introduced to the two
puppets by name (e.g., Lion and Bear) and were encouraged to
say hello. There were three different between-subject learning
conditions for the puppet familiarization phase.
In the tell condition, the participants learned of the puppets’
knowledge statuses by the experimenter’s explicit labeling of the
puppets. For the knowledgeable puppet, the experimenter said,
“I’ve heard that [Puppet name] is someone who knows a lot
and can give us right answers.” For the inaccurate puppet, the
experimenter said, “I’ve heard that [Puppet name] is someone
who doesn’t know much and gives us wrong answers.” For the
guesser puppet, the experimenter said, “I hear that [Puppet name]
is someone who doesn’t know much, and so he just takes a guess.”
In the show condition, the children learned about the puppets’
knowledge statuses through experience watching the puppets
answer questions. This included two tasks: a question-and-
answer task and a guessing game. For the question-and-answer
task, the experimenter asked each puppet a question (e.g., what
is toothpaste used for?) and the puppets responded according to
their knowledge status (e.g., accurate: “to brush your teeth with
so they are nice and clean!”; [guesser]/inaccurate: “[hmm, I’m
not sure. I’ll guess] to have as a snack before bedtime!”). Each
puppet was asked the same question and the process was repeated
with a second question (e.g., why do people carry backpacks).
Which puppet was questioned first was counterbalanced as well
as which question was asked first. Importantly, children heard
both puppets respond to each question. For the guessing game,
the child was told that they (the child, the experimenter, and
the puppets) would hide one of two items (e.g., a ball or a
stuffed toy) inside of a paper bag, and the confederate had to
guess which one it is by asking the puppets questions. The
confederate was told to cover her eyes while the child picked
which of the two items to place inside the bag. In the first trial,
the confederate asked the inaccurate/guesser puppet a question
about what is inside of the bag (e.g., is the thing in the bag
blue?). After the inaccurate/guesser puppet provided a wrong
answer, the confederate guessed the wrong item. The confederate
then asked the experimenter for another try. In the second trial,
the confederate asked the accurate puppet a question and then
guessed the right item.
In the show & tell condition, children learned about the
puppets’ knowledge statuses by both hearing the experimenter’s
explicit labeling of the puppets and the question-and-answer
demonstration and guessing game. The explicit labeling always
preceded the question-and-answer demonstration and guessing
game.
Test Trials
As previously stated, there were four test trials in each within-
subjects informant condition, for a total of eight trials. At the
beginning of the test trials for each condition, a box and four
pictures for the first trial of the set were placed on the table, and
children were reminded, “One of these four pictures is inside of
the box. You can ask our puppet friends questions to figure out
which one is inside. You can ask our puppet friends questions
about what the thing in the box looks like, sounds like, feels like,
does, or any other question about these pictures that will help
you figure out which one is inside. But, you cannot ask us which
picture is the one inside the box. When you think you’ve figured
out what is inside the box, you can guess. Are you ready? Which
one of my puppet friends do you want to ask first?”
The experimenter had prepared responses to questions
developed from methods used in previous research (Mills et al.,
2011) and through piloting the current study. In general, the
experimenter encouraged the child to ask questions about
the item inside the box and redirected ineffective questions.
See Table 1 for specific example questions and responses for
Experiment 1.
Effective questions directed to either puppet informant were
answered by that informant according to its knowledge status:
the knowledgeable puppet gave the correct answer, the inaccurate
puppet gave an inaccurate answer that was plausible based on the
options (e.g., if the child asked what color the thing in the box
was, the puppet would respond with an incorrect color that was
on one of the options but not the correct one), and the guesser
one always expressed uncertainty followed by an inaccurate but
plausible answer (e.g., “Hmm. . .I’m not sure. I will guess. . .”).
After each question and answer exchange, the experimenter asked
the child if he or she wanted to ask another question or take a
guess, reminding the child that the point of the game was to figure
out what was inside the box.
At the end of each within-subjects informant condition,
children answered several metacognitive questions aimed at
testing whether children recognized/remembered the knowledge
status of each puppet. First, children were asked which puppet
provided more right answers. Second, they were asked to indicate
their certainty (“really sure”, “a little sure”, or “not so sure”). For
this item, we used a certainty scale that originally appeared in
Woolley et al. (2004). Third, children were asked whether they
TABLE 1 | Codes for the types of questions children asked.
Types of questions Explanation and/or example question(s)
Effective questions
Function/behavior What does it do?
Property What color is it?; What shape is it?
A part of the whole Does it have leaves?
Ineffective questions
Repetitive The information has already been given by that
puppet
Vague Not clear what the child is asking
Does not distinguish For example, the child asks is it blue? when all of the
options are blue.
“Why” Wording Why is that apple green?
Item What’s in the box?
Off-Task Is your dad a fireman?
Irrelevant For example, the child asks is it blue? when none of
the options are blue.
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thought that one of the puppets provided more wrong answers,
and if so, which one.
After children completed one within-subjects informant
condition, they were introduced to a new set of puppets and
experienced the puppet familiarization task and a new set of test
trials for that particular condition (see Figure 1).
Overview of Coding Scheme
Each session was recorded and then transcribed verbatim. Any
information seeking statements or behaviors (i.e., questions) were
identified and flagged for coding. Each question was assigned a
series of codes. The first code was an “expert code” and reflected
to whom the question was directed (e.g., the accurate puppet, the
inaccurate puppet, the guesser puppet). The other codes reflected
what type of questions children asked. The “Global Question
code” categorized a question as effective (e.g., “what color is
it?”), ineffective (e.g., “is your dad a fireman?”), a clarification
(e.g., “what am I supposed to do again?”), or a guess (e.g., “is
it the blue apple?”). For questions categorized as effective or
ineffective, children received an additional “Type of Question”
code. For effective questions, this code reflected what the question
was about (e.g., physical properties of the object, the function
of the object). For ineffective questions, the code reflected why
the question was ineffective (e.g., off task, vague, not helpful
in distinguishing between the options). Two coders were used
and interrater reliability was 99.42%. See Table 1 for sample
questions.
RESULTS
Overview
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant main effects or
interactions based on the within-subjects informant condition
(i.e., whether a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an
inaccurate one or a guesser).1 To simplify the analyses, the data
were collapsed across this variable for the rest of the analyses.
The analyses are divided into four sections. The first
focuses on the total number of questions asked in this
experiment. The second examines children’s understanding of
which informant was most knowledgeable. The third focuses
on the kinds of questions asked and the strategies involved in
asking questions. The final section focuses on accuracy and its
correlates.
1We believe there are at least two reasons explaining this lack of difference
between the two within-subjects conditions. First, past studies have found that
children’s decisions regarding whom to question depend on the circumstances
under which informants provide responses. When a guessing informant provided
no information or an impossible answer, children learned quickly not to trust
that source. In contrast, when a guessing informant and an inaccurate informant
both provided plausible answers, older preschool-age children are less sensitive
to whether or not the informant indicates uncertainty (see Mills et al., 2011).
Our design is consistent with this latter finding. Second, in this particular study,
children may have had so much experience with the informants through training
that they did not receive any added boost from having the guesser informant mark
his uncertainty before providing an answer. The high performance on determining
which informant to question, described below, supports this idea. We also address
this issue more generally in the discussion.
Total Number of Questions
For each child, the number and type of questions directed to
each informant were assessed. Approximately only 1 percent
of questions were for clarification. Because these clarification
questions were not of central issue to the study, clarification
questions were excluded from the rest of the analyses.
Overall, for both 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds, the total number
of questions asked during the course of the experiment was not
normally distributed. A Shapiro–Wilk test of normality found
that p < 0.005 for both age groups, with the data distribution
positively skewed. For 4-year-olds, children asked as few as 0
questions2 and as many as 32 (M = 11.42, SD = 6.79). For
5-year-olds, this range stretched a bit farther, with as few as 0 and
as many as 40 (M = 13.34, SD = 6.86). Very few children asked
more than 32 questions, though, with most hovering around the
mean. Thus, non-parametric tests were used to further examine
this data.
To examine age group differences, a Mann–Whitney U test
was conducted, revealing that 5-year-old trended toward asking
more questions than 4-year-olds, (M5 = 13.34, SD5 = 6.86
compared to M4 = 11.41, SD4 = 6.79), U = 3739, p= 0.069.
To examine learning condition differences (collapsed
across age groups3), a Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test
was conducted, revealing a slight trend toward a significant
difference in the total number of questions asked between the
learning conditions, X2(2) = 4.56, p = 0.10. A Mann–Whitney
U test revealed that children asked more questions in the show
condition than the tell condition, Mshow = 13.45, SDshow = 7.20,
Mtell = 11.00, SDtell = 7.04; U = 1527, p = 0.049. There were
no other significant differences. The number of questions for the
show & tell condition fell between these two values but closer
to the number asked in the show condition, Mshow&tell = 12.69,
SDshow&tell = 6.25.
Understanding Which Informant Was
Most Knowledgeable
Directing Questions to the Most Knowledgeable
Informant
Descriptively, the majority of the questions were directed toward
the knowledgeable informant over the other informant. Overall,
children directed approximately 70% of their questions to
the knowledgeable informant at greater than chance levels,
t(179)= 11.32, p< 0.001, regardless of age or learning condition
(4-year-olds: Mtell = 67.6%, SDtell = 20.3%, Mshow = 71.1%,
SDshow = 20.2%, Mshow&tell = 63.5%, SDshow&tell = 21.8%;
5-year-olds: Mtell = 70.3%, SDtell = 25.6%, Mshow = 69.3%,
SDshow = 19.1%, Mshow&tell = 74.0%, SDshow&tell = 18.7%).
This appears higher than the percent of questions directed
to the knowledgeable informant in other research contrasting
knowledgeable and less knowledgeable informants (∼60%),
2Children who asked 0 questions still participated in the study as long as they were
willing to guess which picture they thought was in the box. The vast majority of
children – 94% of 4-year-olds and 98% of 5-year-olds – asked at least one question.
3For all Kruskal–Wallis tests, we also examined the data for each age group
separately. No statistically significant differences were found between the three
learning conditions for any Kruskal–Wallis test.
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although it is difficult to compare the performance completely
due to task differences (Mills et al., 2011). We will return to this
point in the discussion.
There are two ways to analyze to what extent children
directed questions toward the most knowledgeable informant.
In one way, we can examine the total number of questions that
children directed toward the most knowledgeable informant.
Presumably, the more questions children direct toward the
knowledgeable source the more likely they are to successfully
solve the task. However, examining the total number of
questions directed toward the accurate source discounts the
amount of distracting information that children may have
been receiving from questions asked to the unhelpful source.
Moreover, this method may more heavily weigh data from
children who asked a large number of questions. In a second
way, we can examine the percentage of questions directed to
the knowledgeable informant. This method takes into account
the extent to which children preferred the accurate informant
over the other informant, but it may skew interpretation
when children were efficient with their question-asking and
thus asked few questions overall, leading to more volatile
percentages. That is, efficient question-askers’ percentage scores
would be more heavily influenced by directing one question
to a different source than the scores of children who asked a
lot of questions. Thus, we look at both types in our analyses
below.
Neither the number nor the percentage of questions directed
to the knowledgeable informant over the other informant
was normally distributed (Shapiro–Wilk test, ps < 0.005).
Instead, the data distributions were negatively skewed, such
that most children were directing most of their questions
to the knowledgeable informant over the other informant.
Thus, first, to examine age group differences, we conducted a
Mann–Whitney U test on the percentage of questions directed
to the most knowledgeable informant, which revealed no
differences between 4- and 5-year-olds (67% compared to 71%),
U = 3689, p = 0.30. A Mann–Whitney U test on the number
of questions directed to the most knowledgeable informant
revealed a significant difference, U = 3501, p = 0.01, driven by
older children directing more questions to the knowledgeable
informant (likely because they asked more questions overall)
than younger children (M4 = 7.78, SD4 = 5.40, M5 = 9.35,
SD5 = 4.82).
Second, to examine differences based on learning condition,
we conducted Kruskal–Wallis tests. There were no significant
differences in the percentage of questions (or the number
of questions) directed to the most knowledgeable informant
between the three conditions, X2(2) = 0.09, p = 0.96,
and X2(2) = 3.30, p = 0.19. Inspecting the data for
each age group separately revealed similar patterns between
the three conditions and significant variability (4-year-olds:
Mtell = 7.15, SDtell = 5.26, Mshow = 10.19, SDshow = 5.37,
Mshow&tell = 7.94, SDshow&tell = 4.62; 5-year-olds: Mtell = 9.11,
SDtell = 4.88, Mshow = 9.35, SDshow = 4.70, Mshow&tell = 10.16,
SDshow&tell = 4.51). Thus, learning condition did not appear
to affect children’s ability to ask more questions to the most
knowledgeable informant.
Explicit Recognition of Which Informant Was Most
Knowledgeable
First, we examined children’s accuracy on the four metacognitive
questions (i.e., which informant was most accurate and which
gave wrong answers for the two within-subject conditions). Chi-
square tests were used to examine age performance for the
total number of correct answers (range from 0 to 4). Older
children were accurate more frequently than younger children,
X2(4) = 24.71, p < 0.001, M4 = 2.70, SD4 = 1.20, M5 = 3.39,
SD5 = 0.98. There were no significant differences based on
learning condition, X2(8)= 6.37, p= 0.61.
Second, we examined children’s accuracy on the metacognitive
certainty scale responses. For the metacognitive questions after
each within-subjects condition, children were asked who they
thought provided more right answers and how sure they were
about this selection. Responses were converted to a 6-point scale,
with six indicating certainty that the knowledgeable informant
provided the most right answers and 1 indicating certainty
that the inaccurate/guesser informant provided the most right
answers.
A 3 (learning condition) × 2 (age group) ANOVA on the
metacognitive certainty scale responses was conducted. There
was a main effect of age group, F(1,182) = 10.03, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.052; older children were more confident in an accurate
direction than younger children, M4 = 4.89, SD4 = 1.29,
M5 = 5.42, SD5 = 1.01. There was also a main effect of
learning condition, F(2,182) = 4.86, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.051. Post
hoc tests with Bonferroni correction found that children were
significantly more confident in the correct informant in the tell
condition than in the show condition, Mtell = 5.50, SDtell = 0.85,
Mshow = 4.88, SDshow = 1.36, p = 0.011. Performance on
the show & tell condition was somewhere between these two
conditions, Mshow&tell = 5.09, SDshow&tell = 1.24. The interaction
between learning condition and age group was not significant,
F(2,182)= 0.17, p= 0.85. See Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 | Mean scores (possible range 1-6, where higher numbers
indicate greater certainty toward the correct informant) on the
metacognitive certainty scale for 4- and 5-year-olds for the three
learning conditions.
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Understanding What and How Much to
Ask
Asking Effective Questions
The vast majority of children’s questions were effective (∼90%)
rather than ineffective. This appears to mirror past work using
a similar paradigm (∼87%; see Mills et al., 2011). The most
common effective question by far was about a property of
the item such as color or shape (75% of effective questions),
although children also sometimes asked about the item’s function
(22% of effective questions). Although ineffective questions were
rare, the most common ineffective questions were either a
“why” question that did not help children gather information
to solve the problem (e.g., “why is that cat brown?”; 35%
of ineffective questions) or a direct question regarding which
item was inside the box, which we had explicitly stated could
not be answered (e.g., “what’s in the box?”; 35% of ineffective
questions).
To move forward with analyses, we first calculated the
percentage of children’s effective questions out of the total
number of questions. Both the number and the percentage
of effective questions were not normally distributed (Shapiro–
Wilks, both ps < 0.05). The data distribution was negatively
skewed, such that most children asked many more effective
questions than ineffective ones.
Thus, first, to examine age differences, we conducted a Mann–
Whitney U test, which revealed that older children provided a
greater percentage of effective questions than younger children
(94.3% compared to 88.5%), U = 3416, p = 0.051 as well as a
greater number, U = 3389, p= 0.006.
Second, to examine differences based on learning condition,
we conducted Kruskal–Wallis tests. There were no significant
differences in the percentage or number of effective questions
between the three conditions, X2(2) = 2.16, p = 0.34 and
X2(2) = 3.67, p = 0.16. Inspecting the data for each age group
separately revealed similar patterns between the three conditions
(4-year-olds: Mtell = 9.33, SDtell = 5.80, Mshow = 12.38,
SDshow = 6.76, Mshow&tell = 10.32, SDshow&tell = 4.45; 5-year-
olds: Mtell = 11.86, SDtell = 6.04, Mshow = 12.71, SDshow = 5.16,
Mshow&tell = 13.13, SDshow&tell = 5.71). Thus, learning condition
did not appear to affect children’s ability to ask effective questions.
Strategy Usage
At the level of each trial, we coded whether children engaged in
some kind of confirmation strategy: asking parallel questions to
the same puppet (e.g., first asking if it was shaped like one possible
shape, an umbrella, then asking the same puppet if it was shaped
like the other possible shape, a butterfly), asking the same puppet
the same question more than once (e.g., first asking the puppet if
it was shaped like an umbrella, then asking the same puppet again
if it was shaped like an umbrella), and asking the same question
to both puppets (e.g., asking one puppet if it was shaped like a
butterfly and then asking the other puppet if it was shaped like a
butterfly). These strategies could help children confirm they had
the right answer or that the two informants said different things
in ways that could help them ask the right informant questions in
the future.
We then calculated the number of trials overall each child
engaged in a confirmation strategy (out of a possible maximum
of 8). The raw number of trials children used a confirmatory
strategy was very positively skewed, and a Shapiro–Wilk test of
normality supported that the data was not normally distributed,
p< 0.05. The vast majority of children never used a confirmation
strategy (N = 106) or used them very rarely (one trial, N = 38;
two trials, N = 18). Only 11 children used these strategies for 5 or
more trials. Non-parametric tests revealed there were no age or
learning condition differences in how many trials children used
confirmatory strategies, all ps> 0.10.
To better understand children’s performance in light of the
skewed nature of the data, we categorized children into two
groups: those who had used a confirmatory strategy at some point
during the study and those who had not. Eighty-two children
used a confirmatory strategy at some point in the study, whereas
106 children did not. Chi-square tests examining patterns of
responses for the two age groups found no differences in the
percentage of children who used a confirmatory strategy at some
point, X2(1)= 0.001, p= 0.97.
Children did, however, trend toward showing different
patterns of confirmatory strategy use across the three learning
conditions, X2(2) = 4.64, p = 0.09. Children were more likely
to use a confirmatory strategy at some point during the study for
the show condition as opposed to the tell condition (50% versus
33%), X2(1) = 3.78, p = 0.05. We believe this finding is due
to children being less certain about which informant was most
helpful in the show condition compared to the tell condition, thus
prompting them to double check that they were asking the correct
informant. There were no other differences.
Asking Enough Questions
For each trial, we examined children’s patterns of questions
to determine whether they had asked enough questions to
successfully narrow down the options so that there was only one
possible correct answer. For some children who were direct in
their inquiry, only a couple of questions were needed; for others,
it took many more. The common characteristic, though, was
that they should have been able to determine the correct answer
based on the responses they had received to their questions.
Therefore, we coded each trial for whether or not the child
had asked enough questions to obtain the right answer. We
then calculated the number of trials overall for which each child
asked enough questions (out of a possible maximum of 8).
The raw number of trials children asked enough questions was
positively skewed (skew= 0.85), with many children never asking
enough questions (N = 85; 45%). Beyond that, performance was
U-shaped: 21 children (11%) asked enough questions for 1 trial,
14 (7%) asked enough questions for 2 trials, 12 (6%) asked enough
questions for 7 trials, and 21 (11%) asked enough questions for 8
trials, with the remainder somewhere between 3 and 6 trials.
We conducted a Mann–Whitney U test on the number of
trials for which children asked enough questions between the
two age groups, which revealed that older children asked enough
questions for more trials than younger children, 3.22 (SD= 2.40)
compared to 1.68 (SD = 3.28), U = 5511.50, p = 0.002. More
than half of 4-year-olds (52%) and a third of 5-year-olds (38%)
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never asked enough questions for any trial during the course
of the experiment. In other words, they stopped short in their
inquiry, gathering some information but not enough to eliminate
all possible answers except one. A Kruskal–Wallis test revealed no
differences between the three learning conditions, X2(2) = 3.36,
p= 0.19.
To better understand children’s performance in light of the
skewed nature of the data, we categorized children into two
groups: those who had asked enough questions at some point
during the study and those who had not. For this variable, we
found a trend toward a difference between the three learning
conditions, X2(2) = 4.81, p = 0.09. A Mann–Whitney U Test
revealed that the show and the tell conditions were significantly
different from one another (U = 1576, p= 0.047). Children were
more likely to ask enough questions for at least one trial during
the study in the show condition compared to the tell condition,
62% compared to 44%; performance for the show & tell condition
was more similar to the show condition at 59%.
Accuracy and Its Correlates
Accuracy
The number of trials (out of a possible 8) for which children
correctly identified which card was inside the box was calculated
for each child. Our first set of analyses focused on the number
of correct answers overall. A 3 (learning condition) × 2 (age
group) ANOVA was conducted on the number of correct answers
obtained. We found a significant main effect of age group,
where older children were more accurate than younger children,
F(1,182) = 19.59, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10. There were no effects of
learning condition. See Figure 3.
For the number of correct answers in each condition, we
also compared children’s accuracy to chance levels (i.e., since 4
possible answers for each trial, chance responding would lead to
2 correct answers out of 8 total items). Overall, children were
more accurate than chance levels, t(187) = 10.65, p < 0.001.
Similar findings were found for each age group and all 3 learning
FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy for 4- and 5-year-olds for the three learning
conditions. The dashed line represents chance performance.
conditions, all ps < 0.001. In other words, overall, children
performed consistently better than chance.
Relationship between Study Variables and Accuracy
Originally, we had anticipated children would obtain the most
correct answers in the show & tell condition, with performance
in the tell condition falling somewhere between it and the show
condition. We found no evidence of that in the data. To better
understand what most highly related with children’s accuracy, we
examined the correlations between accuracy and the following
measures: age, the number of questions directed toward the
knowledgeable source (regardless of effectiveness), the number
of effective questions (regardless of the source), the number of
total questions, the number of trials in which children asked a
confirmation strategy, the response to the metacognitive question
on the 6-point scale, and the number of trials in which children
asked enough questions to obtain the information needed to
solve the problems. Descriptive statistics and correlations for
each condition are provided in Table 2.
In general, all of the task variables noted above correlated
to some extent with accuracy. Age mattered, in that accuracy
increased with age. Understanding which informant was most
knowledgeable mattered, in that both the number of questions
directed to the most knowledgeable informant and the explicit
recognition of which informant was most knowledgeable
(i.e., metacognitive question accuracy) correlated with higher
accuracy. Asking effective questions mattered, in that accuracy
increased with the number of effective questions asked. Use of
confirmatory strategies correlated with accuracy on the task, and
children who used a confirmatory strategy at some point in the
study performed better than children who did not, t(186)= 0.264,
p= 0.009, M= 4.07, SD= 2.23 compared to M= 3.27, SD= 1.92.
Finally, children obtained more correct answers if they at some
point asked enough questions on a trial during the study than if
they did not, t(182.38) = 5.32, p < 0.001, and the more trials in
which children asked enough questions, the more correct answers
they received, consistent with prior work.
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to
examine a model for predicting accuracy. We focused on three
variables of interest: age, the number of questions directed to
the knowledgeable informant, and the number of trials in which
enough questions were asked. The number of effective questions
was not included in this analysis due to this measure having little
variability (i.e., 90% of the questions were effective) and due to
it correlating significantly with the number of questions asked
to the knowledgeable source (r = 0.84). Accuracy (number of
correct trials out of 8) was entered as the dependent variable.
Age was entered in the first step, and then these two variables
were entered in the second step: (a) the number of questions
directed to the knowledgeable source, and (b) the number of
trials in which enough questions were asked. The addition of the
variables in the second step explained a significant percentage of
the variance in accuracy beyond age, 1R2 = 0.31, p < 0.001.
The overall model was significant, F(3,183) = 47.19, p < 0.001.
The regression standardized coefficients revealed that all three
predictors were significant: age (β= 0.19, t= 3.35, p= 0.001), the
number of questions asked to the most knowledgeable informant
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables.
Descriptive statistics
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1) Accuracy 3.62 2.09 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(2) Age 4.87 0.49 0.34∗∗ _ _ _ _ _ _
(3) Number of questions to knowledgeable source 8.55 5.17 0.58∗∗ 0.19∗∗ _ _ _ _ _
(4) Number of effective questions 11.08 6.10 0.45∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.84∗∗ _ _ _ _
(5) Number of trials confirmatory strategies asked 1.05 1.74 0.16∗ 0.04 0.63∗∗ 0.62∗∗ _ _ _
(6) Number of trials enough questions asked 2.43 2.96 0.57∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.23∗∗ _ _
(7) Metacognitive scale rating 5.16 1.19 0.33∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.07 0.27∗∗ _
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
(β= 0.36, t = 4.95, p< 0.001), and the number of trials in which
enough questions were asked (β= 0.28, t = 3.71, p< 0.001).
DISCUSSION
This study examined how children gather information from
others to solve simple problems. Mirroring past research, we
found a number of developmental differences in performance
overall. Older children were better than younger children at
knowing whom to question: they were more likely to explicitly
recognize which informant was most accurate, and they directed
a larger number of questions to the more knowledgeable
informant (but not a larger percentage of questions, perhaps
because older children were simply asking more questions
overall). In addition, older children were better than younger
children at knowing what to ask: they asked a greater number and
percentage of effective questions, and they were more likely to
ask enough questions to narrow down the options to one correct
answer for each item. Thus, older children performed better than
younger children on most parts of the inquiry process, which led
to a higher level of accuracy overall.
Our study differs significantly from past research in that
we examined how different cues regarding the knowledge
status of each informant (i.e., how the informants are likely
to answer questions) influence children’s ability to successfully
gather information for problem solving. We had hypothesized
that the combination of witnessing explicit labels for each
source’s knowledge status and observing how the informants
answer other questions before children began the problem-
solving task (the show & tell condition) would make it
easier for children to determine which source to rely on
for the answers to their questions than when they had to
learn each informant’s knowledge status from observation
alone (the show condition). Consequently, we also expected
performance for just witnessing explicit labels for each source’s
knowledge status (the tell condition) to be somewhere between
the show condition and the show & tell conditions. In
addition, we anticipated that children would perform better
when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with one
who provided inaccurate responses but indicated he was
guessing (the within-subjects guessing condition) than one
who did not (the within-subjects inaccurate condition). Finally,
we expected that how children learned about what each
informant knew would relate to better performance on
other aspects of the task (e.g., question types and strategies
used, explicit judgments regarding which informant was most
knowledgeable, overall accuracy). Our results partially support
these hypotheses.
The above predictions stemmed from the idea that children’s
performance on different aspects of the inquiry task would be
influenced by how clearly they understood which informant was
most knowledgeable. Contrary to our expectations, the within-
subjects manipulation (whether a knowledgeable puppet was
contrasted with a guessing one or an inaccurate one) did not
influence children’s performance. As noted at the beginning
of the results section and described in Footnote 1, in both
within-subjects conditions, children performed similarly well at
recognizing which informant was helpful and which one was not,
and no differences between these conditions were found in any
other aspects of the task. In contrast, and somewhat consistent
with our expectations, the between-subjects manipulation (the
cues children experienced regarding what each informant knew)
influenced children’s recognition of which informant was most
knowledgeable. Children were similarly accurate at identifying
the most helpful and least helpful informants across the three
between-subjects learning conditions, but what differed across
the three conditions was children’s confidence. Indeed, children
were more certain that they knew which puppet was the
accurate one in the tell condition than in the show condition,
with certainty levels in the show & tell condition somewhere
between.
The lower level of certainty in the show condition likely led to
some of the other differences between learning conditions seen
in this study, and these all revolve around the questions children
asked. First, children asked a greater number of questions in the
show condition compared to the tell condition. Second, children
were more likely to use a confirmatory strategy at some point
during the study more often in the show condition than in the tell
condition. In other words, not being certain of which informant
was most accurate may have led children in the show condition
to ask follow-up questions at some point to make sure they were
gathering correct information from the most helpful informant.
This, in turn, may have led to a third main difference between
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the learning conditions: children were more likely to ask enough
questions at some point during the experiment in the show
condition than in the tell condition.
Crucially, though, none of these performance differences
led to drastic differences in children’s performance on the
other aspects of the task. Contrary to our expectations, we
found no evidence that learning condition influenced children’s
ability to direct questions to the most knowledgeable informant,
to generate effective questions, or to solve the problems
accurately.
So why did learning condition not have a greater impact
on performance? One explanation is that, overall, children
were quite successful at determining which informant was most
accurate. During the study, children directed over 70% of
their questions to the more knowledgeable informant, a rate
higher than seen in past studies (Mills et al., 2011). This better
performance is likely due to differences in how children learned
about the informants. In past work, the training involved puppets
answering two sets of why questions that were unrelated to the
problem-solving task (Mills et al., 2011). In the present work, the
training was much more extensive, with puppets in the show and
the show & tell conditions responding to two general questions
as well as two questions specific to helping identify a hidden
object – a task related to the goal of the test problems. This
training provided more direct information regarding how the
informants might respond on the task than the training in past
work, which led to better selection of the most knowledgeable
informant overall and less sensitivity to the informant contrasts
(i.e., knowledgeable versus inaccurate and knowledgeable versus
guesser).
Generally speaking, then, the training for all three learning
conditions gave children a solid foundation for which informant
would be most likely to provide correct answers to their
questions. The main difference was that children were slightly less
certain about who would be most helpful when each informant
was not explicitly labeled. But children proved to be surprisingly
adept at adjusting their strategies to determine which informant
was most helpful. The show & tell condition – where children
received both explicit labels for how the informants tend to
answer questions and witnessed the informants actually answer
questions – did not provide a boost to children’s understanding
of who knew what. In the end, most children appeared to figure
out to whom to direct their questions, and they reported being
either a “little sure” or “very sure” which informant had been most
helpful.
Another explanation for why learning condition did not
have a greater impact on performance relates to where children
struggled in this task—in gathering enough information. Overall,
children were generally successful at knowing whom to question
and at generating effective questions. Our regression analyses
showed that, beyond age, accuracy was clearly linked to both
(1) asking a larger number of questions to the knowledgeable
informant and (2) to having more trials in which enough effective
questions were asked to theoretically narrow down the possible
options to one correct answer. In other words, success on this
task was highly linked to gathering enough information from a
knowledgeable source. Almost half of the children never asked
enough questions on any trial to narrow down the options so
that there was only one possible correct answer. Consequently,
their performance suffered: on average, children obtained correct
answers at greater than chance levels, but not drastically so.
Older children performed better than younger children, but
they were still correct around half of the time. The learning
conditions were designed to influence performance at the very
beginning of the inquiry process and trickle down throughout
the task, but knowing whom to question was not enough to
help children persist through the end in gathering enough
information.
Notably, there was huge variability in performance on many
aspects of the task, from how many questions were asked to
how likely children were to ask enough questions to determine
with certainty the correct answer. At least in the current study, it
appears that the differences between children in their approaches
to this task outweighed the effects of learning condition. To better
understand reasons for differences in performance, ongoing
work in our laboratory examines individual differences that may
contribute to the ability to successfully use inquiry to solve
problems (e.g., verbal skills, working memory skills). Similarly,
related work has demonstrated that children’s curiosity relates
to their question-seeking behavior (e.g., Jirout, 2011). Moreover,
there are significant individual differences in how much children
are interested in closing “information gaps” (Jirout and Klahr,
2012); thus, perhaps some children are more interested than
others in gathering enough information to solve problems
with certainty. More recent research has demonstrated that
temperament plays a role in selective trust, with extroverted 3-
year-olds being more likely than introverted ones to accurately
gather information from appropriate sources (Canfield et al.,
2015). Future research can examine these issues.
In sum, these results are consistent with the idea that how
preschool-aged children learn about what informants know
influences how they engage in the inquiry process. Our evidence
suggests that labeling some sources as helpful may be useful in
some circumstances, particularly when it is hard to determine
which informant may provide helpful answers on one’s own. But
even in the face of uncertainty, children rise to the challenge,
adjusting their strategies to help them more effectively gather
information.
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